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Abstract
Population aging is challenging governments to nd new solutions to
nance the increasing demand for nursing home care and slow down the
increase in expenditures. In this light, many European countries are cur-
rently considering reforms to increase e¢ ciency in the provision of nursing
home services. One popular restructuring policy is the transformation of
public organizations into private nonprot organizations. The underlying
assumption is that private nonprot nursing homes are more e¢ cient than
public nursing homes. However, there is limited empirical evidence to sup-
port this view. This analysis aims to contribute to the evidence base on this
issue by investigating the impact of the organizational form on the costs
of nursing homes. We use a sample of 45 nursing homes from one Swiss
canton over a 5-year period (2001-2005). The applied estimation strategy
provides more accurate estimates as compared to previous studies. In par-
ticular, we distinguish between cost di¤erences that are under the control
of the managers from those that are not (structural). Our ndings suggest
that public nursing homes are more costly than private nursing homes,
although the di¤erence is small. This cost di¤erence is mainly driven by
structural rather than managerial costs. Therefore, cost-reducing policies
that promote private nonprot nursing homes are expected to reduce costs
only slightly.
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1 Introduction
The inuence of di¤erent organizational (institutional) forms on nursing home
(NH) costs is a relevant issue in most health care systems. The institutional form
a¤ects the structural and managerial costs of NHs. Therefore, some institutional
forms may prove to be more successful than others in providing cost-e¢ cient
services. Evidence regarding the impact of institutional forms on costs can
inform policy-makers regarding preferred modes of delivering services to the
elderly population.
In the last decade, di¤erent restructuring policies have been implemented
to control public health expenditures, such as bed downsizing in hospitals (Pia-
cenza et al., 2010). In the provision of nursing home services, a focus of restruc-
turing policies has been the transformation of public NHs into private nonprot
(NFP) NHs. However, little evidence exists on di¤erences in cost e¢ ciency
between institutional forms that support these policies.
This study aims to provide evidence on the impact of the institutional form
on NH costs by exploring data from a region of Switzerland, the canton of Ti-
cino. Because of high heterogeneity in the regulation and denition of nursing
home services across countries, the investigation of di¤erences in cost e¢ ciency
between institutional forms can be better conducted by focusing on relatively
homogeneous areas. Also, the tight and heterogeneous regulation of long-term
care across regions or countries generally implies a limited access to detailed and
comparable data on costs of di¤erent organizational structures. Switzerland
represents an ideal setting for our investigation since NH services are mostly
provided by regulated nonprot rms, and the country exhibits an almost per-
fect balance between private and public organizations. However, Switzerland
is a federal country made of 26 cantons (states) with remarkable di¤erences in
terms of healthcare organization. Cantons have large autonomy in the provi-
sion and regulation of nursing home care. This leads to large heterogeneity in
the organization of the supply. Therefore, the focus on one Swiss canton o¤ers
important advantages in terms of precision of cost data and their comparability
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between institutional forms.
The literature on cost e¢ ciency of NHs has mainly focused on the e¤ect of
the ownership rather than the institutional form (e.g., Chou, 2002; Santerre and
Vernon, 2005; Grabowski et al., 2009). To our knowledge, only a few studies
analyze the impact of the institutional form (e.g., Holmes, 1996; Vitaliano and
Torren, 1994). Two of them use Swiss data (Farsi and Filippini, 2004; Farsi et
al., 2008) but do not distinguish between di¤erent types of e¢ ciency.
In this study, we distinguish between structural and managerial cost di¤er-
ences to explain the mixed results found in previous analyses. Managerial cost
di¤erences reect the ability of the managers to run a facility and can be ex-
pected to vary over time. Structural di¤erences are constant features that are
beyond the control of the managers, and may result from di¤erent production
processes that characterize institutional forms. For instance, we think of po-
litical constraints, labor contracts, governance procedures, the location of NHs,
and constraints in the choice of residents. We propose an empirical strategy
to investigate the presence of both types of cost di¤erences between public and
private organizations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we briey
discuss the related literature on structural and managerial di¤erences between
NFP organizations providing nursing home services. In section 3 we dene
di¤erent institutional forms in NH care and describe our setting. Then, in
section 3.1, we sketch a theoretical model to derive hypotheses on the impact
of managerial behavior and institutional aspects on cost e¢ ciency. In section 4
we present our econometric approach to compare cost e¢ ciency across di¤erent
institutional forms, and we discuss the results. Section 5 is the conclusion.
2 Related literature
Kapur and Weisbrod (2000) recognize that government and private NFP rms
do di¤er in their objective functions. Theoretical work points at di¤erent rea-
sons why public and private NFP organizations may di¤er. The decision-making
process in NHs varies across organizational forms, for instance because of di¤er-
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ent legal constraints or political pressure. Hart et al. (1997) see public managers
as being constrained by some governmentsagreement to implement any cost
innovation decision while managers of private NFP rms can freely implement
these decisions. In addition, these rms are expected to face lower probability
of being bailed out by public authorities or tougher punishment for poor man-
agerial e¤ort. Di¤erences in the institutional form may then lead to di¤erences
in NH e¢ ciency.
From an empirical perspective, the issue of the institutional form in the NH
sector has been partially addressed in the economic literature. The focus has
mainly been on the e¤ect of the ownership form by comparing for-prot to NFP
organizations. Government-run organizations have typically been excluded from
the analyses due to the small presence of public facilities in the US or due to the
expectation that government NHs behave in a very di¤erent way than for-prot
and NFP organizations (Grabowski et al., 2013). These studies show that for-
prot NHs are less costly per client than NFP NHs but provide lower-quality
services (Hillmer et al., 2005; Knox et al., 2002; ONeill et al., 2003; Schlesinger
and Grey, 2006). However, there is lack of empirical evidence on di¤erences
between public and private NFP organizations.
To our knowledge, only a few studies empirically analyze the impact of the
institutional form on the performance of NFP NHs, with mixed results. Farsi
and Filippini (2004) estimate ine¢ ciency using the Schmidt and Sicklers (1984)
random e¤ects (RE) model on Swiss data. The authors show that private NHs
are more e¢ cient than public NHs. The study has two main drawbacks. First,
ine¢ ciency is assumed to be constant over time, and cost di¤erences that change
over time are captured by the error terms. Given the length of the panel, the
assumption of time-invariant ine¢ ciency may not be appropriate. Second, the
results can be biased in the presence of unobserved factors that remain con-
stant over time since the individual e¤ects are interpreted as ine¢ ciency. To
address these limitations, Farsi et al. (2008) apply a true random e¤ect model
(TRE). This model allows for time-varying ine¢ ciency and controls for unob-
served heterogeneity with the individual e¤ects. Therefore, time-invariant cost
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di¤erences are interpreted as heterogeneity. The authors do not nd evidence
of signicant di¤erences between institutional forms. However, the authors only
capture ine¢ ciency that varies over time. Constant ine¢ ciency is captured by
the individual e¤ects rather than being included in the traditional ine¢ ciency
term. This may lead to imprecise results if part of the ine¢ ciency is due to
features that do not change over time.
With respect to previous Swiss studies, the novelties of this paper are two.
First, we propose an empirical strategy that provides information on e¢ ciency
due to structural di¤erences related to the institutional form. Second, we sketch
a theoretical model to disentangle the impact of institutional aspects from the
behavior of managers on cost e¢ ciency.
3 Institutional forms in nursing home care
According to the ownership type, NFP NHs are usually categorized into pub-
lic and private NHs. Although these types are supposed to reect di¤erences
in the control of funds and the production process, the classication may not
e¤ectively capture di¤erences in the organizational form. A more sophisticated
insight looks at the institutional form, which underlines property rights or legal
constraints a¤ecting di¤erent institutions. Hence, public-law NHs are public
administrative units without a separate juridical status from the local public
administration and are directly integrated into it. The governing body is rep-
resented by local politicians (city council), while the executive arm is left to
the municipality, which delegates it to a manager. Conversely, private-law NFP
NHs usually take the form of a foundation. Generally, foundations are created
by individuals or private legal entities. In some cases, local governments decide
to create private-law NFP NHs. Therefore, when local governments set up a
foundation to provide nursing home services, this is a private-law institution
owned by the government. In both of these cases the governing body is the
foundation council.
These institutional types apply to Switzerland where the provision of NH
services is dominated by NFP institutions regulated at cantonal (state) level.
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In some cantons the provision is further decentralized at the municipality level.
In this case, each NH provides care to the residents of a given area. The choice
of the NH does not depend on price and quality aspects since individuals are
usually assigned to the NH in the former place of residence. Therefore, NHs
generally operate as local monopolies, i.e. clients have no choice of NH. Prices
are subsidized by the cantonal regulator, leading to excess demand and waiting
lists. In the Swiss Canton of Ticino, where we focus this analysis, around 51% of
NFP NHs are private-law organizations, and 49% are public-law organizations.
3.1 A theoretical approach
We assume that low managerial e¤ort translates into low e¢ ciency levels of NH
care.1 The total costs of the NH are described by the following equation:
~C = ~   g(e), (1)
where ~ denes costs that are independent of managerial e¤ort, e. ~ is a random
variable that takes value  with probability qz and  with probability (1   qz),
with  > . The subscript z indicates the institutional form, i.e. public-law (Pu)
or private-law NFP (Pr). ~ depends, for instance, on political constraints, labor
contracts, procedures, the location of the NH, and the mix of residents which are
regulated by the law. g(e) is a function that measures the impact of managers
e¤ort on costs. This depends on the di¤erence between the benet of e¤ort for
the NH in terms of cost reduction, (e), and the cost of remunerating managers
e¤ort through an increase in the wage. Hence, managers e¤ort reduces total
cost but may imply a higher wage, wz(e). Generally, the benet of e¤ort for the
NH o¤sets the cost of remunerating managers e¤ort. Therefore, the net e¤ect
of e¤ort is expected to be a reduction in costs, i.e. g(e) > 0. To simplify the
analysis, we assume g(e) = (e)  wz(e) = e.2
The regulator cannot directly observe the NH-specic  and e. The true
value of  and the optimal level of e¤ort to reduce costs can be inferred from the
1This approach is inspired by the early work of Haskel and Sanchis (1995), among others.
2The level of e¤ort e is assumed to be bound in the interval e 2 [0; emax]; where emax =
qz( ). This interval is known to the regulator and ensures that NHs with high costs (~ = )
can never move costs down the low cost level (~ = ).
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observation of total costs C reported by the NH, which are then used to dene
the nancial budget. Consequently, the nancial budget is dened as:
B  E

~C j C

. (2)
The governing board of the NH has the following utility function which is
separable into patientsbenets (s) and rms prots ():
Uz = z + (1  z)s. (3)
z 2 (0; 1) captures institutional preferences that a¤ect the relative impor-
tance of prots with respect to patientsbenets. For example, the board of a
public-law NH may value the preferences of the whole voterscommunity while
a private-law NFP board may value those of the donors or of particular groups
of interest. These organizational constraints may not be exible in the short
run and may not be directly controlled by the manager. They generally require
actions to be approved by the board.
Prots are dened as (e)  B   ~C(e) and the managers utility is given by
the following expression:
Um = [wz(e)  (e)] + mUz((e)); (4)
where (e) is disutility of e¤ort and m 2 (0; 1) is the managers share of the
goals of the board. The managers utility is additive in e¤ort and the degree
of sharing of the boards objectives, with w0z(e)  0, w00z (e)  0, 0(e) > 0 and
00(e) > 0. For simplicity, the reservation utility is assumed to be zero so that
the participation constraint of the manager is always satised for any level of
the wage.
3.1.1 Cost reduction e¤ort
The optimal choice of e¤ort for the manager is obtained from the rst-order
condition to maximize Eq. (4). We rst substitute Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) into Eq.
(3). Using Eq. (3) we then replace Uz in Eq. (4), and nally di¤erentiate Eq.
(4) for the level of e¤ort to get dUm=de = 0. Solving the rst-order condition
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for e we get the equilibrium level of e¤ort as:3
0(e) = w0z(e
) + zm. (5)
In equilibrium the marginal cost of e¤ort is equal to the marginal benet
of e¤ort. The marginal benet of e¤ort can be decomposed into two parts:
the marginal e¤ect of e¤ort on wage, w0z(e), and the altruistic component
zm. The latter component includes cost-reduction e¤ort due to managers
type (m) and cost-reduction e¤ort due to structural di¤erences by institutional
form (z). Higher levels of e¤ort in equilibrium derive from higher incentives in
the wage structure, higher degrees of goal sharing (m), and weaker preferences
for patientsbenets (z). Also, Pu < Pr and w0Pu(e
)  w0Pr(e) if public
boards put more weight on community benets rather than protability and tend
to compensate managers less for their e¤ort.4 The degree to which managers
working in private-law NFP NHs share the objectives of the council is expected
to be higher than, or at least equal to, that of managers working in public NHs.
This statement relies on factors suggested by di¤erent authors in the literature
(Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Wilson, 1989). Managers working in foundations are
expected to be more likely to be driven by altruistic motives and to be punished
in case of poor performance, and are less likely to follow multiple objectives with
which they may not agree.
3.1.2 Structural and managerial ine¢ ciency
To analyze di¤erences in costs between NH types we can decompose deviations
of NH costs from total mean costs into deviations between groups (institutional
3Note that the NH always reveals its true type. Assume that the disutility of e¤ort takes
the form (e) = e
2
2
, and the managers wage is w(e) =  + ze; hence e
 = z + zm.
For C > , the regulator can infer that the NH is a high-cost type. The regulator sets
Bz =    E(ez) =    qz(   )=2 (see footnote 2) and the NH makes prots provided that
qz(  )=2 < z +zm. Conversely, for C   the regulator correctly infers that the NH is a
low-cost type since C =    emax > . Hence, Bz =    E(ez) =    qz(   )=2. Again NHs
make prots for levels of e¤ort qz(   )=2 < z + zm.
4 In the past, the public administration was not able to link the performance of the manager
directly to the level of the salary. Nowadays, the introduction of New Public Management
instruments allows for this link with some restrictions.
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forms) and deviations within groups. Therefore, we can decompose cost devia-
tions into structural (institutional) and managerial components.
We assume that there is an equal number of public-law and private-law NHs
in the market. Therefore, looking at the equilibrium level of cost reduction, we
can disentangle the institutional component from the NH-specic managerial
component:
e   e^ = (e   e^z) + (e^z   e^) , (6)
where e^is the mean cost reduction across institutional forms and e^z is the mean
cost reduction within the same institutional form. The term e^z   e^ represents
deviations from the mean cost reduction due to institutional-specic features (z),
and e   e^z represents deviations from the institutional-specic cost reduction
because of managerial e¤ort.
Assuming (e) = e
2
2 and wz(e) =  + ze and substituting into Eq. (6) we
get:
e   e^ = [(z + zm)  (z + z^z)] + [(z + z^z)  (^ + ^^)]
= z (m   ^z) + [(z + z^z)  (^ + ^^)] , (7)
where ^ =
P
z=Pr;Pu ^z=2, ^ =
P
z=Pr;Pu z=2, and ^ =
P
z=Pr;Pu z=2 are
means between groups, and ^z =
P
m mz is the within-group mean. If the
distribution of managerial characteristics is the same across institutional types,
then ^ = ^z. Hence, [(z + z^z)  (^ + ^^)] = (z   ^) + ^z(z   ^) is the
di¤erence in cost reduction due to NH institutional features, and z (m   ^z)
is the di¤erence in cost reduction due to NH-specic managerial characteristics.
Using (7) and assuming ^ = ^z, we can write total deviations from mean
costs as:
~C   C^ =

~   e

 

^   e^

(8)
=
h
~   ^z

+

^z   ^
i
+ z (^z   m) + [(^   z) + ^z (^  z)] .
In the above equation,

~   ^

are deviations from average structural costs that
cannot be controlled by the institution, and ^ =
P
z=Pr;Pu

qz + (1  qz) 

=2
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are average structural costs over all institutional types. These deviations can be
decomposed into a rm-specic component

~   ^z

and deviations from insti-
tutional form-specic structural costs

^z   ^

, where ^z = qz+(1  qz) . The
other di¤erences in costs across NHs can be decomposed into a managerial com-
ponent and another structural component controlled by the institutional form.
The former component is captured by z (^z   m). The latter component is
dened by the term [(^   z) + ^z (^  z)]. Di¤erences in costs due to insti-
tutional constraints can then be separated from other NH-specic (managerial)
aspects. Note that only part of the (structural) costs due to the institutional
form are exogenous. The remaining part of the structural costs are generated
by institutional aspects that a¤ect the behavior of managers.
To disentangle the managerial and the structural cost components and com-
pare e¢ ciency levels between public-law and private-law NHs, we propose an
empirical approach. This is based on the specication of a cost function, which
is then estimated on the whole population of public-law and private-law NFP
NHs from the Swiss canton of Ticino. As we will discuss later in detail, the two
structural components and the managerial component included in Eq. (8) are
measured by di¤erent terms in the empirical cost model specication.
Note that our theoretical model assumes that the regulator can observe the
institutional form as well as the true type of the NH. Consequently, the regulator
can assign di¤erent budgets not only to di¤erent NH types of the same institu-
tional form, but also to di¤erent institutional forms. Hence, the structural cost
component can be separated from the managerial component. The empirical
approach that follows actually try to disentangle these two components. A sim-
ilar approach could be applied by the regulator using available cost data. This
will provide a measure of di¤erent types of ine¢ ciency and, therefore, could be
used to rene the budget.
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4 The empirical analysis
4.1 E¢ ciency measurement
In order to estimate the level of overall productive e¢ ciency it is possible to use
parametric and non-parametric frontier analysis. In non-parametric approaches,
like Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), the production or cost frontier is con-
sidered as a deterministic function of the observed variables. Conversely, in
parametric approaches, such as Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), the produc-
tion or cost frontier is estimated using econometric methods.5
The major merit of DEA is that the approach does not impose a priori
parametric restrictions on the functional form of the cost frontier, nor does it
rely on distributional assumptions of the error term to identify the e¢ ciency.
However, DEA is deterministic and therefore does not account for measurement
error. On the other hand, SFA species an econometric model for the cost
frontier and assigns part of the deviation from the frontier to measurement
error in the data. SFA also embeds the traditional statistical properties which
can be used to guide the model specication, while this is not possible in DEA.
Further, parametric methods are more attractive to analyze the level of cost
e¢ ciency in the nursing home sector, because they allow us to deal, at least
partially, with the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the production of
health care services. Finally, SFA resorts to economic theory to dene the cost
frontier, rather than being guided by the data only. For these reasons, SFA is
our preferred approach.
The underlying idea of SFA is to use the residual to gather information
regarding ine¢ ciency. The residual "i captures the deviation of both measure-
ment error and ine¢ ciency. SFA focuses on techniques to separate the two
components. These techniques are based on the assumption that the two error
components follow di¤erent distributions: the random component is assumed to
be normally distributed, while ine¢ ciency is assumed to be right-skewed. SFA
models can be distinguished in models for cross-sectional data and models for
5See, for instance, Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003) and Murillo-Zamorano (2004) for a general
presentation of di¤erent methodologies.
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panel data. Panel data models were rst introduced by Pitt and Lee (1981)
and Schmidt and Sickles (1984), who interpreted the rm-specic e¤ect as in-
e¢ ciency. In the following years models were extended to allow e¢ ciency to
change over time (e.g., Battese and Coelli, 1992; Cornwell et al., 1990; Sickles,
2005), though ine¢ ciency and time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity could
never be disentangled. Unobserved heterogeneity captures characteristics of the
NHs such as location or catchment population that a¤ect their costs but are
not under the control of the rm, and therefore should not be attributed to
ine¢ cient behavior.
The recently developed True Random e¤ect (TRE) and True Fixed e¤ect
(TFE) models proposed by Greene (2005) are an alternative to the panel data
models proposed by Pitt and Lee (1981) and Schmidt and Sickels (1984). In the
TRE and TFE models the original stochastic frontier model proposed by Aigner
et al. (1977) is extended by adding xed and random individual e¤ects, respec-
tively. The TRE and TFE produce values of the level of e¢ ciency that vary
over time (transient). In these models the individual xed or random e¤ects
take into account all unobserved variables that are time invariant. Therefore, in
these models any time-invariant (persistent) component of ine¢ ciency is com-
pletely absorbed in the rm-specic constant terms. When the production of
health care services is characterized by a structurally ine¢ cient use of inputs,
these models will produce relatively high levels of estimated cost e¢ ciency.6 For
the current analysis we use TRE rather than TFE due to the convergence issues
encountered with the TFE model. As we will discuss later, we are able to disen-
tangle structural cost di¤erences from time-varying ine¢ ciency by introducing
a dummy variable for the institutional form in our cost model.
6Note that some scholars have recently proposed an extension of the TRE model, the
generalized TRE model that allows for the possibility of estimating the level of persistent and
transient e¢ ciency of an economic agent at the same time. See, for instance, Colombi et al.
(2014) and Filippini and Greene (2015).
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4.2 Detailing the cost function
SFA has been applied to assess the performance of very diverse industries (e.g.,
Castiglione and Infante, 2014; Charoenrat and Harvie, 2014; Danquah and
Ouattara, 2015). Our cost function assumes that NHs transform three inputs -
capital, labor and material - into a single output, measured by the number of
patient-days of nursing care.7 A similar specication is used by Di Giorgio et
al. (2014) to investigate the e¤ects of a change in the payment system using a
cost-regression approach.
We rule out strategic interactions among NHs and their e¤ect on the demand
of residents since NHs are local monopolies. The number of patient-days can
be considered a good indicator of the level of production after controlling for
di¤erences in quality. The total costs function depends on output (Y ), the
prices of labor, capital and material (Pl; Pk; Pm), two output characteristics
(Q1; Q2), a dummy variable (Z) which takes value equal to 1 for public NHs
and 0 otherwise, and time dummies for the years 2002-2005 () which should
capture technological progress in each year:8
C = f(Y; Pl; Pk; Pm; Q1; Q2; Z; ). (9)
The price of labor is calculated as the weighted average wage of di¤erent
professional categories employed in the NH (doctors, nurses, administrative, and
technical sta¤) to avoid multicollinearity problems that may arise with labor
prices for di¤erent categories. The amount of sta¤ as well as their certication
is dened by the cantonal law as a function of residentscase-mix. This rules
out the possibility of increasing cost e¢ ciency by hiring lower certied nurses.9
7Output and input prices are assumed to be exogenous. Output is exogenous because NHs
have to accept all residents in a given area. The price of labor is dened by labor contracts
at the cantonal level, which are equal for all NHs in the sample. Also, the same amortization
schedule and interest rates are applied.
8 In a non-competitive environment such as the Swiss one, there is no reason to assume that
NHs minimize costs. In this case, the estimated cost function is a behavioral cost function
(Evans, 1971) and can still be used to make a comparison among rms. Moreover, by estimating
a total costs function instead of a variable costs function we avoid the risk related to a possible
high correlation between capital stock and output leading to a positive relationship between
variable cost and capital stock (Filippini, 1996).
9The monetary compensation of the sta¤ is also a function of age. Therefore, there exists
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The price of capital is calculated as the sum of mortgage costs, amortization,
and costs related to capital purchases divided by the capital stock, which is
approximated by the number of beds. The price for material is computed by
taking the remaining costs and dividing them by the number of meals provided
each year. This item mainly includes costs for food and residency. Other costs
included are energy, water and administrative costs.
Additionally, we control for some output characteristics that may explain
cost di¤erences across NHs.10 Q1 is an index which measures average patient
assistance by means of normal daily activities such as eating, personal care or
physiological activities. This is calculated on a yearly basis by the Regional
Department of Public Health (RDPH). Patients are classied in one out of ve
categories according to their severity level. Each patient is assigned a value
between 0 and 4, where higher values indicate more severe cases.
Q2 is the nursing sta¤ ratio, that is the ratio between the number of nurses
employed and the number of nurses that should be employed according to the
guidelines of the RDPH (optimal amount of sta¤).11 Because nursing care is
a labor-intensive service, sta¢ ng level has been recognized as a good indicator
for quality.12 Consequently, the nursing sta¤ ratio is regulated by the RDPH.
To avoid worsening quality, NHs are not allowed to deviate from the suggested
number of nurses by more than 10%. Since labor cost represents the major
cost of production (cfr. section 3.2), a small change in the nursing sta¤ ratio
may a¤ect total cost considerably. For this reason, NHs with high costs may
decide to decrease the proportion of workers. On the other hand, e¢ cient NHs
may hire new workers or increase the working time in order to justify additional
the possibility of reducing costs by hiring younger sta¤ members. Due to lack of data, we
cannot rule out this strategy.
10 In order to estimate a cost function, either the output is assumed to be homogenous or we
need to control for service intensity and patientscharacteristics (Birnbaum et al., 1981).
11As compared to other quality indicators related to sta¤ levels, our indicator is conceptually
di¤erent. The nursing sta¤ ratio is the deviation from the optimal number of nurses that should
be employed according to guidelines rather than the number of sta¤ nurses actually employed.
12 In a recent review, Bostick et al (2006) show a positive association between sta¢ ng levels
and quality of care, and the link between sta¢ ng levels and direct indicators of quality, such
as functional ability, pressure ulcers and weight loss.
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costs to the regulatory authority. The endogeneity of the nursing sta¤ ratio is
conrmed by the robust Durbin-Wu-Hausman test performed using the lagged
Q2 as instrumental variable (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). The null hypothesis
of exogenous Q2 is rejected at any standard levels of signicance. To address
the endogeneity problem, lagged values of the nursing sta¤ ratio are used.13
Given that Q2 is determined during the operating year (for example through
exible working time) while the budget is dened at the beginning of the year,
the lagged value of Q2 is expected to be a valid instrument.14
The dummy variable Z captures structural cost di¤erences across institu-
tional forms. This variable can be assumed to be exogenous for two main
reasons. First, organizational form di¤erences are mainly driven by historical
reasons. Precisely, nursing home care was initially provided by religious foun-
dations. Later, increasing demand for nursing home care and lack of supply led
local governments to build new NHs. Second, NHs changing institutional form
are not allowed to benet from nancial advantages.
In order to impose as few restrictions as possible, we adopt a exible translog
functional form approximated at the median value, a less sensitive statistic to
outliers than the mean.15 Input prices and total costs are divided by the mate-
rial price in order to satisfy the homogeneity condition in input prices.16 The
13This is a rather simple approach to tackle endogeneity in frontier analysis where other
classical solutions, such as two-stage least-squares, are not completely satisfactory. See Greene
(2010) for a detailed discussion on endogeneity issues in frontier models.
14The output of the test statistic on the endogeneity of Q2 is: F (1; 44) = 11:52 (p = 0:002).
The endogeneity test is performed on the cost model with rst order coe¢ cients. The statistics
provided give some evidence that the lagged value is a valid instrument. The rst stage
regression summary indicates that the lagged value explains 40% of the variability in Q2.
The Stock and Yogo test at 5% level of tolerance greatly rejects the null hypothesis of weak
instrument (F=80.57 >16.38). The same analysis performed on the two-years lagged value of
Q2 suggests that this instrument is likely to be weak.
15A exible translog functional form is adopted, for instance, by Rosenbaum et al. (2001)
to investigate the e¤ects on costs of relocation of residents from NHs to less expensive assisted
care facilities.
16The cost function is linear homogenous of degree 1 in input prices when a 10% increase in
all input prices leads to a 10% increase in total cost.
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stochastic translog approximation to Eq. (9) for the TRE model is:
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where "it = uit + vit, with uit being the time-varying ine¢ ciency term assumed
to be an iid random variable with half-normal distribution, that is a normal dis-
tribution truncated at zero. vit is a stochastic component normally distributed,
and i is an iid random component in a random-e¤ects framework. The latter
term should capture all time-invariant unobserved factors.
Table 1 summarizes the econometric specications employed in this paper.
Following the estimation of the parameters, we check the concavity condition in
input prices.
4.3 Data and descriptive statistics
Our study exploits an unbalanced panel data set of 50 NHs operating in a region
of Switzerland (canton Ticino) over a ve-year period (2001-2005). The focus
on one Swiss canton is justied by a relatively high degree of homogeneity in the
data, since data imputation processes and some regulatory aspects vary across
cantons. Using data from 26 cantons with large di¤erences in the organization
and the regulation of health care services may undermine the comparability of
the results across institutional forms. Finally, we can exploit some cantonal-
specic information on costs that is not available at the federal level. Clearly,
the period of time to study is limited. However, as compared to previous studies
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on Swiss NHs (e.g., Crivelli et al., 2002), our dataset includes full information
on capital costs for public NHs that was not available before.17
All NHs in the sample are medicalized institutions (skilled NHs) under the
cantonal nursing home planning. The cantonal planning denes daily rates,
the minimum necessary infrastructure, and the amount and certication of sta¤
based on residentsneeds to ensure high-quality standards. It also denes supply
capacity in terms of beds, and subsidies to public-law and private-law NFP NHs.
Consequently, the production process is highly homogenous and comparable
across NHs.
Data are extracted from annual reports delivered to the RDPH by regulated
NHs. NHs with foyers are excluded from our sample.18 One NH shows unrea-
sonable values, hence it is also excluded from the analysis.19 The nal sample
contains data on 45 NHs, 22 private-law NFP NHs and 21 public-law NHs,20
with a total number of observations equal to 215. The number of observations
used for estimation is 210. This is due to the fact that we use the lagged value
of Q2 and for ve NHs we do not have information for the year 2000.
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the main costs and input vari-
ables of interest: mean, standard deviation, median, minimum and maximum
values for our sample. All input prices, total cost and variable cost are inated
to 2005 constant currency units (Swiss francs) using the national Consumer
Price Index. The average cost per resident day in the most expensive NH is
almost twice the average cost of the least expensive home, with an average of
about 233 Swiss francs (Sfr). This di¤erence is at least partially explained by
the large heterogeneity in NHs characteristics. In particular, facilities vary in
17These additional data on amortization costs of public NHs have been made available just
recently.
18Foyers are external residential apartments where nursing care is provided to the most in-
health patients. Since the production process may di¤er substantially when a considerable
share of patient-days is spent in foyers (> 10%), these observations are dropped.
19This NH was initially a for-prot institution and, consequently, changed the regulation
regime. Since for-prot NHs provide luxury residential services, their production process is
hardly comparable with the production process of other NHs.
20The reported number of NHs for each institutional form is the average number of homes
over the whole period considered. The number of private-law NFP NHs ranges from 21 to 23,
while public-law NHs vary between 20 and 22.
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size. The number of beds ranges from a minimum of 28 to a maximum of 162,
which leads to a high standard deviation also in the total annual resident days.
Di¤erences in case-mix characteristics are also remarkable: the average patient
dependency index ranges from 0:8 to 3:8, even though mean and median values
are very close. As expected, the nursing sta¤ ratio is close to 1. In fact, NHs are
supposed to follow the guidelines of the RDPH and to employ as many nurses
as suggested. Large variations are observed for all input prices. The price of
capital shows the greatest variation, mostly explained by investments made to
renew the facility. The labor price shows the average yearly wage of the sta¤
and varies between Sfr 63; 000 and Sfr 94; 000. The mean price for meals is Sfr
8:40 and ranges between Sfr 5 and Sfr 12. These reasonable values support our
specication of material price. Labor costs represent 82% of total costs, whereas
capital costs and material costs account for 6% and 12%, respectively.
To focus on di¤erences between private-law and public-law NHs, we calculate
the mean and the standard deviation of the above variables separately for each
subsample (see Table 3). In the last column of Table 3, we report the results
of a two-sided t-test under the null hypothesis of equal means between the two
groups. The statistics show that public-law and private-law NFP NHs are similar
in many aspects, which also explains the similarity in observed mean costs per
resident. NHs run under di¤erent organizational forms face similar residents
and input prices. The only statistically signicant di¤erence is found in the
average number of beds. Private-law and public-law NHs have, respectively, 59
and 77 beds on average, suggesting that public NHs have decreasing average
costs. Regarding output characteristics, the two groups do not show signicant
di¤erences either in the nursing sta¤ ratio or in the case-mix. Although data do
not show important di¤erences between public-law and private-law NFP NHs,
unobserved factors related to costs may still result in di¤erent performance. For
example, Q2 may capture only part of quality di¤erences. Hence, NHs providing
higher (unobserved) quality services may perform better, ceteris paribus.
18
4.4 Measuring the impact of the institutional form
In this analysis we investigate structural and managerial di¤erences between
private-law and public-law NHs by means of SFA. These models estimate a
benchmarking frontier against which the actual performance of the rms in the
sample is compared.21 Our strategy to measure structural and managerial dif-
ferences relies on the literature on exogenous factors in the analysis of e¢ ciency
and considers two approaches.22 The rst approach relies on the assumption
that the institutional form a¤ects the degree of ine¢ ciency directly, but not
the production process. The underlying assumption is that performance dif-
ferences are due to factors under control of the manager; for this reason they
are interpreted as managerial di¤erences (Coelli et al., 1999). In this case, the
performance of each NH is measured in relation to a single best practice frontier
and the ine¢ ciency term is modeled as a function of exogenous factors. The
second approach assumes that exogenous factors are not under control of the
manager and therefore shift the production function up- or downward, leading to
a direct impact on total costs. For this reason they are interpreted as structural
di¤erences. By including a dummy variable for the institutional form directly
into the main cost equation, we allow for two distinct best practice frontiers.23
Which approach to use depends on the features of the sector under analy-
sis, on the research question, and on the assumption of the estimation model.
In the present analysis, we combine these approaches to simultaneously assess
structural and managerial di¤erences due to the institutional form, and apply
the TRE model to take unobserved heterogeneity into account (Greene, 2005).
Structural di¤erences are interpreted as a shift of the production function and
21For an application of stochastic frontier models to health care institutions, see for instance
Berta et al. (2010).
22The ideal situation to study di¤erences due to the institutional form would be to compare
institutions with the same ownership form but di¤erent institutional forms; i.e., government-
run NHs versus NHs owned by the local government but run as foundation (public foundations).
However, due to the small sample size of public foundation NHs (6:7%), we are not able to use
this identication strategy.
23A similar approach has been applied in the literature on hospital e¢ ciency in order to
study the impact of ownership (Grosskopf and Valdmanis, 1987) and size (Ozcan at al., 1998),
although not combined with a TRE model.
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measured by including a dummy variable in the deterministic part of the fron-
tier. Managerial di¤erences are investigated by using nonparametric tests on
the mean ine¢ ciency obtained from the TRE model, as in Farsi et al. (2008).
We also model the time-varying ine¢ ciency in the TRE model as a function of
the institutional form. However, the results obtained with di¤erent softwares
(NLOGIT and STATA) are not robust and we feel compelled to not use this
approach, even though it is correct from an econometric point of view.24
We estimate TRE models with and without Mundlak correction and, for
comparison purposes, we also run regressions without the institutional dummy
variable in the deterministic part of the frontier.25 Consistent estimates of
RE models rely on the assumption of no correlation between the individual
e¤ects and the covariates. This means that the ine¢ ciency level is uncorrelated
with input choices and output. As shown by Farsi et al. (2005), the Mundlak
correction can be used in frontier models to address the bias deriving from this
correlation. This correction is not used in Farsi et al. (2008). Instead, the
xed e¤ects model allows for partial correlation (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010).
However, due to the low within-variation of the covariates our estimates would be
imprecise (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Clark and Linzer, 2014). Moreover, the
xed e¤ects model does not allow us to estimate the coe¢ cient of time-invariant
factors, such as the institutional form. Note that stochastic frontier models are
robust with respect to distributional assumptions of the error components when
generating comparisons of group mean ine¢ ciencies (Folland and Hoer, 2001).
4.5 Results
Table 4 reports the results of our two approaches (Model 1 and Model 2 es-
timated using NLOGIT Version 5). Model 1 estimates a single benchmarking
frontier, while Model 2 includes the dummy for the institutional form in the
24Detailed information is available upon request.
25We use an ad-hoc Mundlak formulation which consists of including the mean values of
those variables that lead to a rejection of the Hausman test. This approach was developed
to save degree of freedom in the presence of small sample size. The p-value of the Hausman
test after including the Mundlak correction is 0:0613. The variables included are lnQ1, lnPl,
lnYlnQ1, and lnQ1lnQ2.
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deterministic part of the frontier. Models 1b and 2b incorporate the Mundlak
correction.
All the rst-order coe¢ cients are highly signicant and positive, as well as
some of the interaction terms which support the translog functional form. The
estimated coe¢ cients are very robust across the two model specications. More
severe patients are more costly to treat (Q1) and higher sta¢ ng levels also
lead to higher costs. The coe¢ cient of Q1 loses signicance when its mean is
included in the Mundlak specication. This is due to the fact that the mean
captures the majority of the variation. The Mundlak coe¢ cients are all highly
statistically signicant, with signicance levels between 1% and 5%. A rising
trend is observed in year dummy coe¢ cients, which suggests that technological
progress or unobserved factors (e.g. quality improvements) lead to higher costs
each year.
The main result of interest is the e¤ect of the institutional form. The e¤ect of
structural di¤erences on costs is shown in Model 2. When we do not correct for
correlated ine¢ ciency, we do not nd evidence of cost di¤erences between public-
law and private-law NHs. However, after correcting for the bias, the dummy
is statistically signicant at 1% level and shows that public-law NHs are more
costly by 2%. This nding is conrmed also with traditional regression models
(Table 5), although the level of signicance decreases at 10%.26
To investigate managerial di¤erences across institutional forms, we apply
the Kruskal-Wallis test on the estimated ine¢ ciency scores, which are presented
in Table 6 for all NHs, and separately for public-law and private-law organi-
zations. Mean ine¢ ciency is about 3%, both for public-law and private-law
NHs and across all model specications, and reaches up to 17%. The results
from the Kruskal-Wallis test conrm that there are no systematic di¤erences
by institutional form in mean ine¢ ciency (see Table 7). These results suggest
that di¤erences in costs across institutional forms are mainly due to structural
di¤erences rather than managerial performance.
26A model with ownership type (private vs. public) instead of institutional form was also
considered. The results showed that ownership type does not a¤ect total costs.
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In the last rows of Table 4, we provide the estimated constant (0), the
standard deviation of the individual e¤ects (), the standard deviation of the
error term (), and the ratio () between the standard deviation of the ine¢ -
ciencies (u) and the standard deviation of the stochastic term (v). Note that
all these components are highly signicant. Since the value of  denes the rel-
ative contribution of the ine¢ ciency term with respect to the stochastic term,
a positive and statistically signicant number supports the existence of the two
error components.27 The di¤erence in the  coe¢ cient between the two models
arises because of the di¤erent model specication.
Our results indicate that the Hessian matrix of the estimated cost functions
with respect to input prices calculated at the approximation point is not neg-
ative semi-denite. Thus, the concavity condition is not satised in any of the
specications, meaning that rmsstrategies are not responsive to changes in
input factor prices. This can be explained by the fact that input choices in Swiss
NHs are substantially limited by regulation (Filippini and Farsi, 2004). The in-
terpretation of the estimated coe¢ cients in Table 4 relies on the behavioral cost
framework proposed by Bös (1986).
5 Conclusions
It has been suggested that the consumer surplus can be lower in the mixed
(public and private) oligopoly than in private oligopoly when public rms are as
e¢ cient as private rms. However, the government may not privatize the public
rm unless its e¢ ciency is low enough as compared to private rms (Bárcena-
Ruiz, 2012). To what extent do public NHs di¤er from private NFP NHs in
terms of cost e¢ ciency? Policy-makers in several European countries are cur-
rently debating the advantages of replacing public organizations with private
organizations (e.g., foundations) for the care of elderly people. Restructuring
27We analyzed the skewness of the OLS residuals. As Waldman (1982) shows, when the
OLS residuals are skewed in the wrongdirection, the results from the maximum likelihood
estimator are those of a simple OLS rather than a cost frontier. The normality test shows
that our OLS residuals are right skewed (0:23) and the null hypothesis of normally distributed
residuals can be rejected at 99% signicance level. Therefore, our data and model specication
support the adoption of stochastic frontier models.
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policies have shown their limitation as a viable strategy for controlling public
health expenditure, at least in the hospital sector (Piacenza et al., 2010). Finan-
cial pressure on health care budgets is increasing, and little evidence is available
on the performance of di¤erent types of NFP NHs.
Through this study, we investigated di¤erences in cost e¢ ciency between
institutional forms of nursing home care using data from the Swiss canton of
Ticino. Our main purpose was to disentangle di¤erences in cost e¢ ciency due
to structural (time-invariant) aspects from managerial (time-varying) aspects,
which is generally neglected in the related literature. To this end, we rst esti-
mated a cost frontier based on a TRE model. This empirical strategy performs
well in the presence of latent heterogeneity and time-varying ine¢ ciency. How-
ever, the fact that structural di¤erences are captured by the individual e¤ects
may be a limitation. Therefore, we proposed an alternative empirical strategy
by accounting for the institutional form in the deterministic part of the cost
frontier. We believe this is a valid approach to assess the impact of organiza-
tional characteristics on the performance of NHs in the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity.
We found that structural di¤erences lead to higher costs of public-law NHs
as compared to private-law NHs. However, these cost di¤erences are relatively
small. Moreover, this may be due to the fact that public-law NHs face more
political constraints than private-law NHs because the political system attaches
a value to factors such as governance procedures, location and choice of residents.
Conversely, we found no evidence of systematic managerial di¤erences between
public-law and private-law NHs. One possible explanation for this result is
the extensive regulation that a¤ects all NHs in the region. Since costs are
tightly controlled by the regulator, little room is left for management discretion.
Another explanation may be that private nonprot and public NHs face similar
constraints. Foundation councils set restrictions on the decision-making power
of their managers like in public NHs. Finally, relatively small cost di¤erences
may be due to unobserved quality di¤erences between public and private NHs.
From a policy point of view, our results suggest that promoting private NFP
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NHs tends to reduce the costs for elderly care, although the reduction is quite
small. From an empirical point of view, our ndings show the importance of
testing for both structural and managerial di¤erences in costs between insti-
tutional forms. Because of data availability, our study was limited to a short
period of time (5 years). Therefore, changes in e¢ ciency that may require a
longer time to occur are not captured. Further research using longer datasets is
needed to disentangle more precisely the di¤erences in structural and managerial
costs across organizational forms of long-term care. Finally, our ndings cannot
be easily generalized to other regions since they may not reect structural and
managerial cost di¤erences in other regulatory settings.
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TRE TRE with Mundlak formulation
Firm-specic component i iid
 
0; 2

i =  Xi + i
Xi =
1
T
TP
t=1
Xit
i  iid
 
0; 2

Random error "it "it = it + uit "it = it + uit
uit  N+
 
0; 2u

uit  N+
 
0; 2u

it  N
 
0; 2

it  N
 
0; 2

Ine¢ ciency E [uit j uit + it] E [uit j uit + it]
Table 1: Econometric specications of TRE models.
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max
Average cost (Sfr/resident day) 232.80 26.40 235.50 172.85 297.60
Total annual resident days (Y ) 24032 9780 21911 9925 58324
Average dependency index (Q1) 3.08 0.37 3.14 0.80 3.80
Nursing sta¤ ratio (Q2) 0.966 0.090 0.96 0.74 1.55
Average labor price in Sfr per employee (Pl) 80266 4817 80613 63363 93704
Average capital price in Sfr per bed (Pk) 5398 2671 4993 1054 22891
Average material price in Sfr per meal (Pm) 8.35 1.20 8.32 5.15 11.70
Number of beds 68 27.4 64 28 162
Notes: All monetary values are in 2005 Swiss francs (Sfr), adjusted by the national Consumer Price
Index.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the main costs and input variables (210 obser-
vations).
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Private-law NHs Public-law NHs t-test
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Average cost (Sfr/resident day) 233.90 29.55 231.60 22.70 0.650
Total annual resident days (Y ) 20755.80 7252.45 27464.80 10882.70 -5.342
Average dependency index (Q1) 3.104 0.369 3.071 0.371 0.659
Nursing sta¤ ratio (Q2) 0.969 0.111 0.963 0.062 0.512
Average labor price in Sfr per 80068.70 4987.40 80474.05 4647.10 -0.616
employee (Pl)
Average capital price in Sfr 5451.20 3369.30 5342.25 1665.50 0.298
per bed (Pk)
Average material price in Sfr 8.20 1.25 8.50 1.13 -1.630
per meal (Pm)
Number of beds 59 21 77 30 -5.111
Number of homes 22 21 -
Number of observations 107 103 -
Notes: All monetary values are in 2005 Swiss francs (Sfr), adjusted by the national Consumer Price
Index. Signicance levels: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%.
Table 3: Di¤erences in mean costs and inputs among institutional forms.
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Random e¤ects model RE model with Mundlak
Variables Coe¢ cients Std.Err. Coe¢ cients Std. Err.
Y 0.942 0.017 0.936 0.014
Q1 0.184 0.054 0.044 0.072
Q2 0.149 0.051 0.150 0.050
Pl 0.580 0.035 0.576 0.039
Pk 0.114 0.010 0.101 0.010
dt2002 0.036 0.009 0.039 0.009
dt2003 0.046 0.009 0.049 0.010
dt2004 0.031 0.009 0.033 0.009
dt2005 0.056 0.010 0.059 0.010
YY -0.018 0.060 0.024 0.052
Q1Q1 1.094 0.511 1.105 0.507
Q2Q2 -0.006 0.311 0.064 0.309
PlPl 0.406 0.238 0.522 0.238
PkPk 0.164 0.030 0.161 0.029
Q1Q2 -0.339 0.267 -0.069 0.277
YQ2 0.007 0.117 0.009 0.115
YQ1 -0.283 0.119 -0.506 0.140
YPl 0.160 0.075 0.111 0.072
YPk 0.030 0.026 0.049 0.024
Q1Pl 0.545 0.237 0.442 0.231
Q1Pk -0.285 0.091 -0.247 0.087
Q2Pl -0.284 0.207 -0.280 0.204
Q2Pk -0.043 0.081 0.021 0.081
PkPl -0.166 0.076 -0.198 0.074
Mean Q1 - - 0.367 0.077
Mean Pl - - 0.132 0.057
Mean Q1Q2 - - -2.544 0.546
Mean YQ1 - - 0.553 0.182
Z 0.004 0.013 0.018 0.011
0 15.411 0.013 15.402 0.012
R2 0.982 0.988
Notes: Signicance levels: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%.
Table 5: Results of the non-frontier models RE and RE Mundlak (210 observa-
tions).
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MEAN MANAGERIAL INEFFICIENCY Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
All NHs (N=210)
Model 1a 0.0324 0.0191 0.0087 0.1647
Model 1b 0.0251 0.0113 0.0083 0.0972
Model 2a 0.0326 0.0193 0.0086 0.1671
Model 2b 0.0281 0.0143 0.0086 0.1193
Private-law NHs (N=107)
Model 1a 0.0333 0.0224 0.0088 0.1647
Model 1b 0.0253 0.0131 0.0083 0.0972
Model 2a 0.0337 0.0228 0.0089 0.1671
Model 2b 0.0291 0.0168 0.0086 0.1192
Public-law NHs (N=103)
Model 1a 0.0315 0.0149 0.0087 0.0709
Model 1b 0.0250 0.0090 0.0097 0.0500
Model 2a 0.0316 0.0150 0.0086 0.0712
Model 2b 0.0271 0.0110 0.0093 0.0587
Table 6: Mean managerial ine¢ ciency of public-law and private-law NHs.
Kruskal-Wallis test on equality of mean Single stochastic Separate (institutional)
managerial ine¢ ciency between groups frontier stochastic frontier
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b
p-value 0.8211 0.5269 0.9685 0.8018
Table 7: Results of the Kruskal-Wallis test on the equality of mean managerial
ine¢ ciency between public-law and private-law NHs.
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